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MONSTROUS WICKEDNESS AND THE JUDGMENT OF KNIGHT 
Penny Crofts* 
In February 2000, Katherine Mary Knight killed, then skinned, 
decapitated and cooked her lover in rural Australia. Knight 
pleaded guilty to murder and received a life sentence, against 
which she unsuccessfully appealed in Knight v R [2006] 
NSWCCA 292. I consider the way in which the majority 
judgments organised and expressed Knightʼs culpability in 
accordance with a model of monstrous wickedness, arguing 
that models of wickedness articulated and applied in criminal 
law should be evaluated critically. The judgment of the court 
constructed and responded to Knight as bad, a monster who is 
(and will always be) dangerous (especially to men) and 
ultimately irredeemable. Not only do monsters justify and 
require extreme measures, they also contaminate and 
undermine systems of orders – the judgments of Knight thus 
read more consistently with the genre of horror than that of law. 
The model of monstrous wickedness ostensibly works 
particularly well for women who kill, as it preserves the lawʼs 
tendency to organise women as lacking agency. However, this 
model also generates a clash of binaries when applied to 
women. The monster/victim binary ascribes agency to the 
monster, generating difficulties for the law to reconcile the 
notion of a female monster with legal assumptions of the 
absence of female agency. This results in the problem of the 
female monster. The judicial creation of a horror movie monster 
that lacks basic humanity facilitates an abdication of the legal 
(and moral) task of judging a human being as human. 
In February 2000, in Aberdeen, New South Wales, Katherine Mary Knight 
killed her lover, John Price. She then skinned and decapitated his corpse, and 
cooked parts of the body. Although Knight was charged with murder, the 
focus of the judgments of the courts was upon Knight’s mutilation of the 
corpse. This article analyses how the courts constructed Knight’s 
culpability.1 There are different ways of organising and articulating what it 
means to be wicked and culpable, and I argue that the courts constructed 
Knight’s culpability as monstrous through an emphasis upon her 
transgressions of the borders of humanity and her malevolence. The choice 
and application of the model of monstrous wickedness have implications in 
terms of the type of legal responses available and required, the potential for 
contamination and the criminal law’s construction of the legal subject.  
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This article is a contribution to a relatively recent reinvigoration of the 
analysis of evil,2 in part due to the increased invocation of a political rhetoric 
of evil after the terror attacks of September 11.3 Criminal law theorists and 
practitioners tend to avoid or ignore normative accounts of the criminal law, 
and focus instead on the specifics of offences or concerns regarding claims 
of jurisdiction or authority, the organisation of social relations or the 
constitution of the legal subject. This avoidance of engaging with what it 
means to be wicked is consistent with a general trend noted by philosophers 
of wickedness,4 resulting in unexamined assertions and the application of 
narrow and/or weak models. I argue that a focus upon wickedness is 
consistent with a rich jurisprudential tradition seeking to articulate the 
criminal law as a system of blaming. This characterisation of the criminal 
law is not contentious; rather, it is consistent with the representation of the 
criminal legal system and practitioners of the system to themselves and also 
to a wider audience.5 The criminal law holds out its own practices as models 
of culpability, showing how and why persons are to be held accountable, on 
what terms, and who by. In doing so, it structures and sanctions a specific 
ordering of morality, fixing responsibility and representing culpability.6 A 
major question of the criminal law is that of blameworthiness: is the 
defendant sufficiently blameworthy or culpable to justify criminal sanctions?  
Much criminal law is concerned with badness or petty wickedness, and 
philosophical accounts of wickedness assist in the examination and 
interrogation of the expression and ordering of culpability. Philosophies of 
wickedness highlight that wickedness does not exist independently or a 
priori, but is constructed and expressed through discourses – including the 
law7 – and there are different models of wickedness available.8 The choice 
and application of different models have different implications. In this 
article, I draw upon Phillip Cole’s models of wickedness outlined in The 
Myth of Evil,9 where he proposes four secular conceptions of wickedness: 
psychological evil, instrumental evil, pure evil and monstrous evil. I focus 
primarily on the intersection of the expression of monstrous wickedness and 
the construction of the legal subject, and examine the implications for a 
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conditions through which questions of guilt and responsibility are organised leading to the 
construction of a (criminal) subject. 
7  Davies (2008), p 373. 
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gendered subject. In Knight, we come up against the limitations of criminal 
law’s conceptualisation of blame, responsibility and badness, revealing the 
need for more nuanced accounts of wickedness, and a critical awareness of 
the assumptions, costs and implications of different models of wickedness.  
My analysis of the judgment of Knight has two major interlinked 
themes. In the first section of this article, I consider the way in which the 
majority judgments organised and expressed Knight’s culpability in 
accordance with a model of monstrous wickedness. I argue that the judgment 
of the court constructed and responded to Knight as bad, a monster who is 
(and will always be) dangerous (especially to men) and ultimately 
irredeemable. The courts’ emphasis upon Knight’s transgression of borders 
and malevolence, and her unreasoning nature, reflected and reinforced the 
construction of Knight as monstrous. The reliance in the judgments upon the 
model of monstrous wickedness had implications for sentencing, and also 
the boundaries of the legal system. Not only do monsters justify and require 
extreme measures, they also have the potential to contaminate and 
undermine systems of orders – the judgments of Knight read more 
consistently with the genre of horror than that of law. 
In the second section, I explore the implications of monstrous 
wickedness and gender configurations. I draw particularly upon Cole’s 
explanation of monstrous evil, as this provides insight into the construction 
of Knight’s culpability. Cole’s exploration of the monstrous is important 
because it highlights the interrelationship of the construction of evil with 
questions of agency. By ‘agency’, I mean a shorthand term denoting ideas 
about the capacity to act in a rational or purposive manner. I demonstrate 
how the model of monstrous wickedness ostensibly works particularly well 
for women who kill, as it preserves legal assumptions of feminine passivity 
When women kill, their behaviour is regarded as needing to be explained, 
and this is done either through a discourse of victimisation and/or one of 
madness.10 Both these subject positions ascribe limited agency due to either 
circumstances or irrationality. Similarly, the role of monstrous evil 
(ostensibly) prescribes limited agency to characters. Monsters are inscribed 
as irrational, malevolent creatures that want our suffering, requiring extreme 
responses in order to reinstate the boundaries they have challenged. 
However, this model also generates a clash of binaries when applied to 
women. The monster/victim binary ascribes agency to the monster, 
generating difficulties for the law to reconcile the notion of a female monster 
with legal assumptions of a lack of female agency. Should we create a 
category of the monstrous victim, allowing multiple subjectivities, with 
Knight occupying the position of both victim and perpetrator? Or should the 
model of monstrous wickedness be removed from the repertoire of the 
criminal law?  
The law enunciates and applies models of wickedness when attributing 
blameworthiness, and we should critically evaluate the models and their 
implications. I argue, in accordance with Cole, that monstrous wickedness is 
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based on a model that is overly simplistic, draws upon fiction and trivialises 
wickedness. It requires an excessive response and potentially contaminates 
the law whilst simultaneously providing an occasion to reaffirm the legal 
order. The category of monster signifies problems in understanding and the 
treatment of wrongdoers, particularly women who kill. Zizek has argued that 
monsters are a fantasy scenario that obfuscates the true horror of a 
situation.11 I maintain that the legal construction of Knight as a horror movie 
monster who lacks basic humanity results in an abdication of the legal (and 
moral) task of judging her as human.  
My focus of analysis is upon the legal construction of Knight’s 
culpability, rather than on the coverage of the case by the media, on the 
internet and in ‘true crime’ books, which also contribute to conceptions of 
culpability.12 Meaning is socially produced and the criminal law is a 
powerful discourse in the construction of the notion of what it means to be 
bad or wicked. I place the legal judgments of Knight at the centre of my 
analysis, and supplement this analysis with an examination of fictional 
representations of monsters. This is because monsters are typically 
associated with fiction. These works of imagination provide a detailed 
account of the problem of evil, and a template of necessary and justified 
responses. Analysis of law through and with fiction emphasises that notions 
of wickedness are constructed or created. Accordingly, I embrace the idea 
that both law and literature are acts of creation. This conjunction of law and 
literature is particularly apparent in philosophies of wickedness. Almost all 
philosophies of wickedness utilise criminals and fictional characters as their 
primary basis for theorising.13  
I examine three judgments of Knight. Justice O’Keefe was the 
sentencing judge at first instance, and sentenced Knight to life imprisonment 
– the first time such a sentence had been imposed on a woman in Australia. 
On appeal, Chief Justice McClellan (with whom Latham J agreed) held that 
the sentence imposed by Justice O’Keefe was appropriate. McClellan CJ 
quoted Justice O’Keefe’s judgment at length, with fifteen of the nineteen 
pages of his judgment a direct quote from the judgment at first instance. 
Throughout the article, I will refer to these judgments as the majority. In a 
minority judgment, Justice Adams held that there was not an error in the 
judgment of O’Keefe J; however, he stated that he would not have imposed a 
life sentence on Knight, but instead the possibility of parole in 33 years. All 
three judgments utilise a lexicon of wickedness. O’Keefe J (quoted by 
McClellan CJ) refers to Knight’s ‘evil acts’,14 while Justice Adams talks of 
her ‘moral culpability or (to use an old-fashioned term) the wickedness that 
                                                           
11  Zizek (1999) p 91. 
12  For example, see Lee (2002); Lalor (2002). 
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fictional creations such as Mephistopheles, Hyde and Iago. Flahault (2003) focuses upon 
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14  Knight v R [2006] NSWCCA 292 (11 September 2006) at 24; R v Katherine Mary Knight 
[2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 111. 
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was involved’.15 McClellan CJ and Adams J also considered her to be guilty 
of ‘heinous’ acts – a word used to denote odious, highly criminal acts. There 
is also much emphasis in the judgments upon Knight’s malice – a term 
historically utilised in criminal law to denote wickedness.16 I contribute to 
research on the philosophies of wickedness by demonstrating the ways in 
which models of wickedness from fiction are reflected and reinforced in 
legal constructions of blameworthiness. 
Facts of the Case 
After realising that her de facto, Price, was planning on finishing their 
relationship, Knight stabbed him at least 37 times in various parts of both the 
front and back of his body using a butcher’s knife. Through an analysis of 
blood stains, it was established that Price was first attacked in the master 
bedroom, then in the hallway as he attempted to escape Knight. He 
succeeded in getting outside but was then either dragged or returned to the 
house and fell in the hallway quite close to the doorway that led into the 
lounge room, where his body was later found by the police.  
After Price had died, Knight then dragged his body from the hallway 
into the lounge room and skinned it. ‘This was carried out with considerable 
expertise and an obviously steady hand so that his skin, including that of his 
head, face, nose, ears, neck, torso, genital organs and legs, was removed so 
as to form one pelt.’17 Knight then hung the pelt on a meat hook on the 
architrave of the door of the lounge room before decapitating Price’s body 
and arranging it with the left arm draped over an empty soft drink bottle, and 
the legs crossed. Knight also removed parts of his buttocks and took the 
‘excised parts of Mr Price’ to the kitchen and made a ‘sickening stew’ in a 
large pot with his head, and freshly peeled and prepared vegetables.18 The 
pieces cut from Price’s buttocks were baked in an oven with other peeled 
vegetables and then arranged on plates together with the baked vegetables as 
meals for Price’s son and daughter. A third piece was thrown on the back 
lawn – whether for consumption by dogs or for some other reason was not 
revealed in the evidence. Knight claimed that she had suffered abuse as a 
child and adult, and that her relationship with Price was violent. 
Psychologists accepted that Knight had a borderline personality disorder.  
The court described the circumstances of the case as ‘horrendous’.19 
Knight claimed that she could remember nothing of the aftermath of the 
killing, pleaded guilty to murder, and was sentenced to life imprisonment. 
The court held that this was within the most serious category of murders due 
to her premeditation and enjoyment of the acts of defilement. Her ‘evil 
actions’ indicated cognition, volition, calm and skill. At no time did she 
                                                           
15  Knight v R [2006] NSWCCA 292 (11 September 2006) at 52. 
16  Kaye (1967) pp 365–95. 
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18  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 20. 
19  Knight v R [2006] NSWCCA 292 (11 September 2006) at 10. 
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express any remorse or regret for what she had done. Knight was 
unsuccessful in her later appeal against the life sentence.20 
Constructing Monsters: Transgressing Borders and Malevolent 
Intent 
The majority judgments constructed Knight as monstrous, rejecting any 
nuances that might have complicated the notion of Knight’s culpability, 
preferring to reduce her motives to irrational intent and malevolence, 
rejecting any past victimisation, and explaining her actions as due to her 
‘nature’. In this section I consider how the judgments organise and express 
Knight as wicked. I argue that the model of monstrous wickedness 
communicated in the judgments of the court constructed and responded to 
Knight as bad, a monster who is (and will always be) dangerous (especially 
to men) and ultimately irredeemable. According to the monstrous 
conception, those who are willing to inflict suffering on others purely for its 
own sake are monsters in human form. They are capable of pure evil 
precisely because of their monstrosity. These monsters constitute a different 
class of humanity – they are not like you and me. This conception of evil 
tends to be portrayed in fiction, with villains and/or monsters with 
superhuman powers filled with malevolence towards us, but is also present 
in political rhetoric and media representations of some criminals.21 This 
conception considers evil to be beyond the limits of humanity – beyond 
explanation, incomprehensible to normal human beings. I then go on to 
consider the implications for monstrous wickedness in terms of sentencing 
and the boundaries of the legal system. 
Transgressing Borders 
The central theme of monstrous evil is the transgression of borders of 
humanity. Monsters are conceptualised as beyond understanding, as 
incomprehensible to human beings. This theme of transgressing borders has 
been explored from a variety of different perspectives and disciplines. 
Derrida framed the idea in terms of undecidability;22 Mary Douglas 
considered pollution and contamination fears of disorder from an 
anthropological perspective;23 Kristeva explored the idea of abjection in The 
Power of Horror: ‘It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes 
abjection but what disturbs identity, system, order. What does not respect 
                                                           
20  Knight v R [2006] NSWCCA 292 (11 September 2006). 
21  Cole (2006), pp 13–16. 
22  The classic monsters of horror films, zombies, have been used to explain Derrida’s ideas 
about undecidability. Zombies might be ‘EITHER alive OR dead. But it cuts across these 
categories: it is BOTH alive AND dead. Equally, it is NEITHER alive NOR dead, since it 
cannot take on the “full” senses of these terms … in terms of life and death, it cannot be 
decided.’ See Collins and Mayblin (1996), pp 17–20. 
23  Douglas (1966/2002). 
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borders, positions, rules. The in-between, the ambiguous, the composite.’24 
While there are significant differences in these theories, each of these 
perspectives stresses the idea that the disorderly, abject or undecidable disturbs, 
transgresses or undermines identity, system and order. The different theoretical 
analyses of the monstrous, disorderly, abject or undecidable emphasise the fear 
and fascination they generate because of their potential to challenge our 
cherished borders. We fear the monstrous because of its potential to contaminate 
and undermine cherished borders, to blur and weaken dividing lines that affirm 
binary relations. This is because monsters not only break rules and cross borders, 
but also challenge the border itself, by being both and neither one thing and 
another. The monstrous contaminates the crime scene and the legal system, 
highlighting the fragility of the law.  
The idea of transgressing borders is essential to the construction of the 
monstrous in the horror film. The specific nature of the border may change 
from film to film, but the function of the monstrous remains the same: to 
bring about an encounter between the symbolic order and that which 
threatens its stability.25 The monstrous is produced at the borders – the 
border between the living and the dead;26 man and beast;27 good and evil;28 or 
the monstrous is produced at the border that separates those who take up 
their proper gender roles and those who do not29 – sane and mad.30 I will 
explore the various ways in which the judgments asserted that Knight had 
transgressed significant borders.  
Fiction and Reality 
One border transgressed by Knight was the one between fiction and reality. 
The judgments accept that Knight was inspired by the horror film 
Resurrection. The blurb for the film was ‘WARNING: Most mind blowingly 
shocking film you will see this year’, and the movie was rated R18+ with 
medium-level violence. It was directed by the director of Highlander, 
Russell Mulcahy, and stars Christopher Lambert as Detective John 
Prudhomme. The slayer kills 33-year-old males with the names of apostles 
each Friday, carving verses of the Bible into their flesh. Each time, he 
removes a body part with ‘almost surgical precision’ in order to create a 
body of the dismembered parts for the resurrection of Christ. He needs the 
blood of a newborn baby boy born at midnight of a mother named Mary, and 
it is his routine/predictability that is his downfall. Detective Prudhomme 
saves the baby (and in the process himself), and shoots the slayer. Rather 
than viewing the film, Justice O’Keefe accepted the psychiatrist’s evaluation 
                                                           
24  Kristeva (1982), p 4. 
25  Creed (1993), p 11. 
26  Vampires and zombies disrupt the borders between living and dead.  
27  For example, the genre of werewolf movies. See also Stevenson (1886/1979). 
28  For example, Rosemary’s Baby, The Omen, Wolf Creek. 
29  For example, Psycho, Dressed to Kill. 
30  For example, Resurrection. 
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that Knight enjoyed ‘macabre’, ‘disturbing and gruesome’ videos. For 
Justice O’Keefe, simply watching horror films was an indicator of Knight’s 
disturbed nature. However, for horror film fans (including myself), 
Resurrection is not particularly graphic or horrifying. Much of the killing 
takes place off screen, with the focus instead on the (late) arrival by the 
police to an abject scene organised by the perpetrator. The first violence on 
screen is by the police against one of their own.  
Technically, the film is rated as a thriller rather than horror in the video 
store.31 What is horrifying, however, is Knight’s crossing over the border of 
fantasy into reality. Resurrection was ‘not only extremely violent, but 
directly related to the charge against the prisoner. That video gave to the 
actions by the prisoner in relation to Mr Price’s body a sense of “copy 
cat”.’32 The film ‘depicted gruesome murders, decapitation, a skinned body 
and the hanging of a body on a meat hook.’33 Knight repeated scenes from 
Resurrection in her organisation of the crime scene. Much has been written 
about the pleasure and fears of the fictional representation of crime – the 
production of crime as entertainment.34 In her analysis of detective fiction, 
Young notes the pleasure of the self-administration of fear and suspense.35 
Audience members attempt to predict which horror films will provide an 
acceptable dose of fear and abjection, and are comforted by the sense that, 
whatever happens, the excursion into the fearful world of criminality and 
evil will be followed by a return from fear. In the case of detective fiction, 
this is usually through revealing the identity of the criminal and some kind 
of retribution. In horror films, the monster may be killed or stopped, but part 
of the enjoyment for a true horror fan is that a (good/bad) monster is not 
killed (enough) to prevent re-emergence in a sequel. The comfort for a 
horror fan is that the scenes and monsters represented are fictional, 
representing the non-existent bogey-man, alien, undead/dead. Knight crossed 
this border, importing scenes from Resurrection into her crime scene. In 
Resurrection, the third body is decapitated and the headless corpse is seated 
on the toilet. The slaying, skinning, decapitation and arrangement of the 
corpse by Knight were inspired by fantasy.  
Not only was Knight inspired by fantasy, but she brought the pleasure 
of fantasy into her crime scene. ‘The last minutes of his life must have been 
a time of abject terror for him, as they were a time of utter enjoyment for 
her.’36 The court emphasised that she took ‘perverted pleasure’ in the killing 
and mutilation of Price.37 She derived ‘satisfaction’ from ‘committing quite 
                                                           
31  See Clover (1992) regarding her methodology of accepting video store categories as the 
basis for her research on horror films.  
32  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 70. 
33  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 67. 
34  Naffine (1997); Young (1996), Ch 4. 
35  Young (1996), p 79; Young (2009). 
36  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 112. 
37  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 71. 
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cruel acts’,38 ‘she enjoyed doing what she did’39 and ‘she enjoyed doing what 
she was doing as she skinned and dismembered Mr Price and cooked parts 
of his body’.40 For some, her enjoyment and pleasure in cruelty places her 
beyond the borders of humanity. For example, Thomas Hobbes stated ‘that 
any man should take pleasure in other men’s great harmes, without other end 
of his own, I do not conceive possible’.41 This assumes that humans will not 
take pleasure in evil for its own sake, and thus Knight transgressed another 
border through her enjoyment.42 Knight’s actions disrupt the association of 
crime with fear and horror, instead emphasising the pleasure of crime – a 
pleasure usually intertwined with the realm of fiction rather than reality. She 
transgressed the border between reality and fantasy, and imported 
inappropriate affect into the crime scene. 
Borders of Law 
In addition to transgressing the border between fantasy and reality, much of 
Knight’s behaviour not only broke the law, but was also at and beyond the 
borders of the law. Crime disturbs the system of law; it undermines law and 
order while also providing an opportunity to reaffirm the legal order. In 
killing Price, Knight transgressed the border between life and death, 
demonstrating the fragility of this border.43 However, it is not the killing that 
is focused upon in the judgments in the construction of Knight’s wickedness 
– homicide does not always result in an attribution of monstrous wickedness. 
Rather, the judgments are concerned with what occurred at and beyond the 
borders of the law. The spatial imagery in the judgments reiterates this 
theme of acting ‘outside’ the law. McClellan CJ stated that: ‘This was an 
appalling crime almost beyond contemplation in a civilised society.’44 Great 
emphasis was placed upon her history of violence in past relationships, but it 
was noted that Knight had no criminal record. Her behaviour was thus both 
illegal and legal – never prosecuted, but subject to the potential of 
prosecution. Even the violence in the relationship with Price occurred 
outside of the law. When Price called the police to eject Knight from the 
house in the days before the killing, the police refused, advising Price to get 
an Apprehended Violence Order (AVO). Price sought an AVO just before 
the murder, stating that he wished to end his relationship with her and 
prevent her from entering the house. This AVO was not effective in 
                                                           
38  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 78. 
39  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 80. 
40  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 71. 
41  Hobbes (1651/1991), p 126. 
42  In contrast, Freud (1930/1975) thought it was quite natural that we would sometimes take 
delight in the suffering of others who are strangers to us. 
43  In contemporary law, this is expressed as a secular border, but historically an unnatural 
slaying was an evil in and of itself, causing tainting to the slayer and potentially the 
community, requiring expiation. See Finkelstein (1973), pp 169–290; Fletcher (1978). 
44  Knight v R [2006] NSWCCA 292 (11 September 2006) at 45. 
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protecting Price from Knight, highlighting the fragility of the law’s 
boundaries, the inability to intervene in time.  
Knight’s actions highlighted the tardiness of the law – she had months 
of planning before the killing itself.45 The judgments asserted that Knight’s 
premeditation was particularly relevant to her culpability: 
The level of culpability of the prisoner is, as I have determined, 
extreme. The murder was premeditated. The prisoner not only decided 
to murder Mr Price, but planned the timing and what she was going to 
do in a manner which left open to her, as she thought, a way of 
escaping punishment, namely that she would be considered as mad.46 
Knight had indicated an intention to kill Price many months prior to the 
murder, including saying to one of her daughters that ‘I told him if he took 
me back this time it was to the death’.47 Price had also previously expressed 
fear that Knight would kill him. The court accepted that the trigger for the 
murder was 48 hours prior to the slaying. Knight’s behaviour demonstrates 
the links between premeditation and abjection, as her premeditation 
disrupted meaning and heightened the display of the fragility of the law.48 
This is because the time prior to the murder was one of pretence – she 
presented positively and lawfully even whilst planning murder.  
This idea that Knight’s actions were beyond normal humanity and the 
law was also highlighted in reactions to the case. On hearing the facts of the 
case, the first question I was consistently asked was where the case had 
happened. My Australian colleagues assumed the case was either fictional or 
had occurred somewhere else, usually America. It was beyond 
contemplation that this could occur in rural Australia. 
Defilement of the Corpse 
It is Knight’s defilement of the corpse in particular that illuminates her 
disruption of the boundaries of the law. Her treatment of the corpse was so 
far beyond the law that it was not explicitly the subject of statutory 
prohibition,49 nor was she charged with any offence relating to her treatment 
of the corpse. As Knight argued on appeal, the focus in sentencing upon her 
actions after the slaying was irrelevant to the charge of murder. To disrupt 
the narrative of the monstrous, Knight attempted instead to normalise her 
                                                           
45  Rush (1997). 
46  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 87. 
47  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 46. 
48  Kristeva (1982), p 4. 
49  The Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), s 81C criminalises ‘misconduct with regard to corpses’ with 
a maximum penalty of two years’ imprisonment; however, there is no offence of 
cannibalism. The absence of an offence of cannibalism could arguably be not because of a 
failure to contemplate its possibility, but rather due to a fear of producing the very 
deviance that is feared. This argument has been made in relation to the English legal 
system’s response to lesbianism: Hart (1994). 
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actions, asserting it was all too normal for a person to kill their lover, that 
this was ‘a common domestic murder’. Adams J rejected her argument: 
Although at first I was minded to think that too much had been made 
of her subsequent dealings with Mr Price’s body, I have concluded, 
on reflection, that so extreme was this conduct and so closely linked 
in time and place was it with the killing that it must be regarded as an 
integral part of the killing itself.50 
Despite the focus of the judgments, the defilement of the body was not 
the subject of charges; it was beyond the classificatory systems of law. The 
judges were compelled to consider actions that were beyond the formal 
boundaries of the law, reiterating the idea of Knight as monstrous. Monsters 
are conceptualised when (legal) categories are exhausted. In this case, her 
acts were so heinous as to be beyond the law.  
It is through the focus upon Knight’s treatment of the corpse that 
Knight is inscribed as monstrous. Knight’s removal of Price’s skin was 
described by the court as a ‘rite of defilement’. The word ‘rite’ denotes 
something which is repeated, emphasising the majority perspective that the 
killing and defilement of Price was consistent with Knight’s past behaviour 
and character. The removal of Price’s skin literally transgressed the border 
between the visible, knowable outside of the body and its secret insides. This 
is a border that is in the form of one thin membrane, ‘protected only by a 
collective taboo against its violation’.51 The removal of Price’s skin 
undermined the clean and proper body. ‘Many of the wounds were deep, and 
extended into vital organs. These included the aorta, both lungs, the liver, the 
stomach, the descending colon, the pancreas, and the left kidney, the lower 
pole of which had virtually been sliced off.’52 Knight saw, and enabled others 
to see, the ‘opened’ body. 
In addition, Knight used her skills as an abattoir worker to remove 
Price’s skin. ‘This was carried out with considerable expertise and an 
obviously steady hand so that his skin, including that of his head, face, nose, 
ears, neck, torso, genital organs and legs, was removed so as to form one 
pelt.’53 Knight then hung the pelt on a meat hook on the architrave of the 
door of the lounge room. She treated the human body like an animal’s, 
demonstrating the fragility of the border between humans and animals.54 
Also, despite attempts by the court to reinstate Price’s identity, the court too 
was contaminated, using the word ‘pelt’ – a word usually associated with 
animal skins – to describe Price’s skin.  
                                                           
50  Knight v R [2006] NSWCCA 292 (11 September 2006) at 64. 
51  Clover (1992), p 32.  
52  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 9. 
53  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 16. 
54  Nussbaum (1999). 
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The treatment of Price as food further transgressed the border between 
humans and animals. Knight treated Price as we would cuts of meat. Knight 
cooked Price’s head to produce a ‘sickening stew’: 
The pieces which had been cut from Mr Price’s buttocks were baked 
in the oven of the premises by the prisoner together with other of the 
vegetables she had peeled. The gruesome steaks were then arranged 
on plates together with the vegetables she had baked and left as meals 
for the son and daughter of the deceased, accompanied by vindictive 
notes to each in the handwriting of the prisoner. A third piece was 
thrown on the back lawn, whether for consumption by dogs or for 
some other purpose is not revealed in the evidence.55 
It is unclear whether Knight ate part of Price’s body, and the judgment does 
not speculate. It is clear, however, that she did treat him as food. Food 
loathing is a major source of abjection, and in horror films this is frequently 
represented – especially through eating human flesh.56  
Knight’s treatment of Price’s corpse disrupted and undermined his 
identity: ‘The prisoner decapitated Mr Price’s body and at some stage 
arranged it with the left arm draped over an empty soft drink bottle, and the 
legs crossed. This was said in evidence to be an act of defilement 
demonstrating contempt for Mr Price’s remains.’57 In decapitating Price she 
removed his identity – a person’s face is a means by which we recognise 
them. She made Price her plaything. She then sustained this disruption of his 
identity with the removal of his skin, leaving only her marks upon him:  
On another occasion she sliced Mr Price’s left chest with a knife. The 
scar from this was still visible on his body following his death and 
skinning. It is perhaps not coincidence that the only part of Mr Price 
that was not skinned by the prisoner was that part of him which bore 
the scar which she inflicted.58 
Knight left her mark on Price’s body – she exercised ownership of him. She 
transgressed the border between self and other, invading and subsuming 
Price, and perhaps absorbing him.  
Unreasoning Malevolence 
Another indication that Knight was constructed as monstrous (or pure evil) 
was the emphasis in the majority judgments upon her malevolence. The 
                                                           
55  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 21. 
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57  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 16. 
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motives of monsters are beyond understanding, incomprehensible to human 
beings, and it is this inability to explain that leads to the use of the concept 
of monstrous wickedness.59 Monsters are figures of pure malevolence who 
want nothing other than our suffering and destruction. The majority 
judgments accepted that Knight’s acts were committed for no reason; her 
actions were deemed incomprehensible to ‘normal’ human beings, with the 
judgments musing that she did this because of her ‘nature’, her ‘violent 
personality’. However, there were other ways of exploring and constructing 
Knight’s culpability that did not rely upon the model of monstrous evil, and 
these alternatives were available in the judgments. These alternatives did not 
emphasise Knight’s malevolent, unreasoning nature.  
The first alternative is a psychological conception of wickedness, which 
asserts that where humans commit what would be described as evil acts, 
there must be an explanation that does not involve them freely or rationally 
choosing those actions. This model assumes such acts are committed 
through either necessity or madness,60 and can thus be characterised as a 
denial of the possibility of evil freely chosen, a lack of agency. As I argue 
below, this idea that a perpetrator was a victim of circumstances or madness 
is a particularly common argument for female offenders. Knight sought to 
portray herself as a victim of sexual abuse by her brothers, and as a victim of 
violence in her marital and de facto relationships. The court rejected her 
claims of sexual abuse and determined that even if she had been the victim 
of physical abuse, she ‘gave as good as she got’. The possibility of violence 
in the relationship between Knight and Price was barely entertained by the 
court; her earlier visit to the doctor with injuries was seen as part of her 
attempts to ‘set the scene’. Knight’s claims that she was a victim of madness 
were also unsuccessful. Two of the three psychiatrists asserted that Knight 
had a borderline personality disorder, but that this did not preclude agency, 
control or cunning – instead: ‘The personality problems demonstrated in the 
history of Ms Knight’s life are not in my view psychiatric disease – they are 
her nature … The main effect of Ms Knight’s personality problems was to 
cause difficulties for others.’61 These findings precluded describing Knight’s 
behaviour as mad, and established the authority of the courts to judge her as 
a competent legal subject.  
In addition, there was potential in the judgments to organise Knight’s 
culpability according to the model of instrumental evil. According to this 
perspective, humans cannot be evil in the pure sense of willing suffering on 
others for its own sake, but they are capable of impure evil, which is the 
infliction of suffering upon others for some human end, such as wealth, 
security or power.62 An evil person is willing to make others suffer in order 
to achieve their goal, but the goal is distinct from the suffering. This model 
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60  Cole (2006), p 17. 
61  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 75. 
62  Cole (2006), pp 16–17. 
CROFTS: MONSTROUS WICKEDNESS AND THE JUDGMENT OF KNIGHT 85 
accords agency to the actor – a person can make choices (albeit bad ones) to 
achieve certain ends. In sentencing Knight to life imprisonment, Justice 
O’Keefe stated: 
I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that her evil actions were the 
playing out of her resentments arising out of her rejection by Mr 
Price, her impending expulsion from Mr Price’s home and his refusal 
to share with her his assets, particularly his home, which he wanted to 
retain for his children.63  
On this account, Knight chose to kill Price because he would not leave her 
the home and he planned to finish the relationship. Thus she could be 
characterised as acting purposefully to achieve certain ends, such as 
vengeance, or to prevent Price from leaving her. Moreover, her desire to be 
seen as mad could provide a reason for her treatment of Price’s corpse. 
However, the model of instrumental evil is not dominant in the majority 
judgments of Knight. In contrast, in keeping with the monstrous model of 
wickedness, the majority judgments placed great stress upon Knight’s ‘utter 
enjoyment’ in the final minutes of Price’s life. This enjoyment is 
inconsistent with the instrumental model, which stresses that the suffering of 
others is not a goal of the act, only a necessary means towards achieving 
something else.64 
Not only did the majority judgments minimise any reason for Knight’s 
slaying of Price; there was a persistent refusal throughout the majority 
judgments to accept any reasons for her past behaviour except malice or 
spite. This can be seen in the court’s response to Knight’s claims of violence 
and bad treatment at the hands of her de facto husband, David Saunders:  
In particular, she claimed that on one occasion he had kicked her in 
the stomach at a time she thought she was pregnant, as a consequence 
of which she got a knife and went immediately into the back yard and 
as an act of revenge cut the throat of Mr Saunders’ eight week old 
puppy whilst Mr Saunders was watching. On a later date the prisoner 
damaged Mr Saunders’ car. It was at about this time that she took an 
overdose of sleeping tablets and was admitted to a psychiatric 
hospital.65 
She took out a number of AVOs against Saunders. In contrast, Saunders 
claimed their relationship was ‘basically good’, and that it was Knight who 
had assaulted him:  
Whether Mr Saunders was the aggressor in the relationship is not able 
to be resolved satisfactorily on the evidence before the court. 
However, what is clear and uncontradicted is that there were a 
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number of violent and vengeful acts by the prisoner toward Mr 
Saunders and his property and these included an instance in which a 
stabbing instrument was used to inflict injury and another in which 
she killed a puppy by cutting its throat as an act of malice and 
revenge directed at Mr Saunders.66 
Similarly, Knight claimed that her relationship with Chillingworth was also 
violent. The court accepted that Chillingworth was addicted to alcohol at the 
time of their relationship. ‘Mr Chillingworth’s statement reveals a number of 
spiteful and vindictive acts, including the smashing of his false teeth because 
it was claimed that he had smacked one of the daughters of the prisoner – a 
claim which he denies.’67 
Knight’s explanations for past violence tended to revolve around the 
protection of her children or herself. The court ignored evidence by one of 
Knight’s daughters that Saunders had been violent towards Knight. Knight’s 
history of relationships could have been organised according to the 
instrumental conception of evil where she used violence to achieve specific 
ends. Admittedly, Knight exercised imaginative and extravagant acts of 
revenge, but this does not preclude the possibility that her violence was a 
response to abuse. However, the majority preferred to regard Knight as 
acting without any reason or justification except a preference to inflict 
suffering. This precluded any instrumental reasons for her behaviour. For 
example, Adams J asserted that the ‘extraordinary extent of the applicant’s 
brutality, and perhaps of greater significance, her lack of what we might 
recognise as humane feelings, which were, I think, completely buried in 
unreasoning and irrational hatred for her victim’ were relevant.68 For the 
majority, there was never, nor could there ever be, any reason for doing what 
she did. She was unreasoning.  
In contrast, the minority judgment by Justice Adams allowed for more 
complexity in the construction of Knight’s culpability. Adams J expressed 
doubt about the ability of psychiatrists to evaluate actions like Knight’s 
defilement of Price’s corpse. He noted that ‘such patients are, thankfully, 
very rare. Experience of them must necessarily be limited.’ This scepticism 
caused Adams J to question the psychiatric evaluations wholeheartedly 
accepted by the majority of Knight as uniformly and consistently dangerous 
and wicked. Rather than attempting to construct Knight as inherently and 
consistently violent and dangerous, Adams J asserted that there was a 
qualitative difference between effect and culpability of Knight’s past actions 
compared with the murder of Price. He also rejected the idea that the 
prisoner had such great enjoyment of the murder and mutilation of Mr 
Price.69 This allowed Adams J some space to organise Knight’s culpability 
according to the model of instrumental evil. Even though her reasons were 
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not sufficient to justify what she did, they did provide some explanation – 
that is, while her actions were wrong, they were still those of a human 
exercising choice – albeit bad choice.  
Implications of Monstrous Wickedness 
Sentencing 
The reasoning justifying the imposition of life imprisonment is consistent 
with the implications of monstrous wickedness:70 
This was an appalling crime almost beyond contemplation in a 
civilized society. The applicant determined to kill the deceased in a 
violent manner inflicting multiple deep wounds and after his death set 
about mutilating his body and in a macabre manner presented 
portions of it as a meal for his children. The crime was the product of 
a violent personality intent upon claiming the life of her de facto in a 
relationship which was plainly failing. She expressed no remorse or 
contrition. The psychiatric evidence indicates that her personality is 
unlikely to change in the future and, if released, she would be likely 
to inflict injury, perhaps death on others. The deceased’s family may 
be at particular risk.71 
This belief in her future dangerousness suggests that, unlike mere mortals, 
Knight will not weary with age. Even in her seventies, she would remain 
dangerous.72 The exclusion of any explanation for her behaviour means that 
redemption is impossible. Knight was inscribed as consistently dangerous 
and malevolent – both in the past and future. This generalised malignant 
intent meant that she was perceived as dangerous to the family, to men and 
to society generally. ‘Were she to be released into the community at any 
time she would be likely to inflict serious injury, perhaps death and even 
mutilation, on those who cross her.’73 The court majority constructed a 
character that was a (born) monster, wanting nothing more than our extreme 
suffering and destruction.  
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Monstrous evil demands and justifies extreme measures. Theorists note 
our desire to resolve undecidables, disorder and the abject, whether 
expulsion or exclusion, to reassert boundaries, rules and law. For example, 
vampires require stakes through the heart and perhaps burning; zombies can 
only be finished off by decapitation.74 In the case of Knight, the majority 
regarded life imprisonment – the most extreme response available – as 
necessary and justified. Life imprisonment imposed a literal and symbolic 
boundary upon Knight. With no possibility of release or redemption, or 
change in her situation apart from death, the life sentence resolves and exiles 
her, rendering her place in/out of society certain, so the community and law 
do not need to reside in the zone of undecidability. 
In contrast, Adams J asserted that, with age, Knight may no longer be a 
danger to society: 
She is now almost 51 years of age. Were I considering the matter 
afresh, I would have imposed an overall sentence of 45 years with a 
non-parole period of 33 years. This would have had the effect of 
enabling the applicant to be considered for release on parole when 
she was 77 years of age. I think that the Authority and the Council 
would be well qualified to make an appropriate assessment as to 
whether she could then be released and, if so, on what conditions.75 
Justice Adams thus emphasised that Knight, like all humans, would grow 
older. As such, she would be likely to become less dangerous to the 
community, and it would be appropriate to leave questions of dangerousness 
to experts in the future, rather than to assume that she was inherently 
dangerous.  
Contamination of the Crime Scene 
We fear the monstrous because of its potential to contaminate and 
undermine cherished borders, to blur and weaken dividing lines that affirm 
binary relations. Monsters render fluid what we understand to be fixed. They 
destabilise fundamental cultural dichotomies such as life/death, 
human/inhuman. If these basic distinctions are not operative, than neither are 
other cherished binaries.76 Knight’s actions undermine assertions of the 
autonomy and closure of law77 as the judgment is contaminated by Knight’s 
actions and reads more like a horror story than a crime scene. Horror films 
wallow vicariously in normally taboo forms of behaviour before restoring 
order. They are saturated with scenes of blood and gore, pointing to the 
fragility of the body. In Resurrection, blood is smeared across the walls and 
floors where the killing took place. Knight copied the killer in Resurrection 
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and bled Price before arranging his corpse on the couch. The judgments in 
Knight dwell on the blood of the victim, fascinated by the loss of a great deal 
of blood, the ‘smearing of blood’,78 the blood stains ‘splattered and smeared 
throughout various parts of the house and in a pool’,79 as well as on the floor 
where the killing took place. The blood stains provided ‘graphic and 
disturbing evidence’ of the process of the slaying.80 Justice O’Keefe was 
concerned about the effect of such ‘graphic’ evidence on potential jurors, an 
issue that was avoided due to Knight’s guilty plea on the first day of trial.  
The judgment can be read as an attempt for the court to reassert control 
over the crime scene to restore the law. Through premeditation, Knight 
controlled the crime scene, knowing the effect that decapitation would have 
on police from the horror film. In Resurrection, the police arrive after the 
murders to a crime scene organised by the killer. The camera dwells on the 
effect of the scene on the police. The decapitated corpse excites particular 
horror in the police officers: 
Oh my God. Oh my God. Oh my God. What’s this guy got, a 
chopping list or something? Where’s his head? There’s a guy sitting 
in front of me having a crap, and his head’s gone. Where’s his head? 
I have never seen anything like this, never.81 
The judgment refers to the effect of the killing Price as ‘horrendous’, 
‘beyond the experience of any of the professional people’. ‘A number of 
police officers who were highly experienced in examining crime scenes 
found the need to take stress leave because of the situation with which they 
were confronted when examining the crime scene at Mr Price’s house.’82 
Knight controlled the abject scene, infiltrating and contaminating the 
criminal event in such a way that the judgments became horror stories rather 
than solely legal stories.  
Various attempts were made in the judgments to reinstate the law. The 
court used objective language to reassert authority as neutral arbiter: 
The circumstances of and surrounding the killing of Mr Price can 
thus be seen to be horrendous … Objectively the circumstances mark 
the killing and its accompanying incidents as being of the most 
gruesome kind, the murder as being in the most serious category of 
the crime.’83 
The court attempted to state the facts in neutral language, but these attempts 
were undermined by the reliance upon descriptive language more suited to 
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the language of horror – such as ‘horrendous’, ‘gruesome’, ‘macabre’ and 
‘grisly’. The extent to which the law was operating in an unfamiliar genre 
was shown by O’Keefe’s misspelling of ‘grisly’ as ‘grizzly’ – a mistake 
quoted without correction by McClellan CJ.84 
The courts also made great efforts to reinstate Price’s identity, which 
had been undermined by Knight’s decapitation, skinning and cooking of the 
corpse. Throughout the judgment, Price was consistently called ‘Mr Price’, 
in contrast to the practice of other homicide cases where he would have been 
denoted as either ‘the deceased’ or the ‘victim’. At times, these linguistic 
efforts are quite awkward – for example, ‘the cooking of Mr Price’s head 
took place at a time into the early morning of 1 March 2000’85 and ‘the 
skinning, dismemberment and partial cooking of Mr Price had taken place’.86 
Labelling the victim ‘Mr Price’ throughout can be contrasted with the 
tendency in the judgments to call Knight either ‘the prisoner’ at first 
instance, or ‘the appellant’ on appeal. The judgments sought to reinstate 
Price’s identity and erase Knight’s.  
The contamination of the legal system through Knight’s action is 
portrayed starkly in the treatment of Price’s body post mortem: ‘So expertly 
was it done that, after the post mortem examination, the skin was able to be 
re-sown [sic] onto Mr Price’s body in a way which indicated a clear and 
appropriate, albeit grizzly [sic], methodology.’87 As a consequence of 
Knight’s actions, the legal system played with Price’s corpse as well. The 
contamination of the crime/legal scene reflected and reinforced her 
construction as monstrous. The courts were compelled to cross over borders, 
to examine and judge actions that undermined and challenged laws and 
humanity, and that were beyond the contemplation of humanity and law.  
The court organised Knight’s culpability as monstrous by emphasising 
the transgression of cherished borders with enjoyment and pleasure, for no 
reason or justification. According to this conception, she acted against or 
beyond the law with no reason. Her behaviour transgressed the law, 
undermining cherished boundaries between reality and fantasy, human and 
animal, and human and food. In the process, her actions contaminated the 
law, with the case reading more as horror story, the crime scene polluted. 
The court inscribed Knight as monstrous due to her rites of defilement – 
through her abject behaviour, she became contaminated and polluted, an 
inhuman/human. The court sought to clarify and reinforce these borders 
through the figure of the monster, de-emphasising ambiguity, clearly placing 
her outside human behaviours and roles. 
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The Problem of Female Monsters 
I have argued that the model of monstrous wickedness arises when our 
borders and systems of order and understanding fail. Theories of the 
monstrous, abject, disorderly and undecidable emphasise that where we 
draw our boundaries, how we organise our systems of classifications, are 
contingent. Much of the fear associated with the monstrous is because they 
may compel us to question and redraw our cherished systems of order.88 In 
law, the monstrous emerges when legal categories are exhausted and the 
perpetrator is characterised as being beyond the law’s understanding. I 
would argue that legal categories are exhausted particularly early for women 
who kill. Feminists have noted that the subject positions available for 
women who kill are those of victim, mad or bad.89 Moreover, within these 
categories, there is a preference in criminal law to organise women who kill 
as victims in the agent/victim dichotomy.90 Statistically, women are most 
likely to enter the criminal legal system as victims rather than as 
perpetrators. Crime is perceived as a predominantly masculine pastime, 
hence male offenders do not need to be explained. In contrast, it is 
exceptional for women to commit crimes, so they are deemed doubly 
deviant: as offending against both the state and femininity.91 When women 
kill, their behaviour is regarded as needing to be explained, and this is done 
either through a discourse of victimisation and/or one of madness.92 Both of 
these subject positions ascribe limited agency due to either circumstances or 
irrationality. This is consistent with a legal preference to organise women as 
lacking agency. 
A similar preference for the category of ‘victim’ has been noted in 
feminist examinations of evil. Gendered forms of evil – particularly 
domestic violence, sexual assault and abuse – have appropriately and 
effectively been the central motif of many feminist legal engagements, with 
some extremely important and beneficial consequences for women. Part of 
the success of these engagements has been through appeal to the victim 
subject.93 However, many feminists have recognised that the exclusive 
reliance upon the victim subject to make claims for rights and female 
empowerment has serious limitations.94 An exclusive focus on women as 
victims of violence does not reveal the complexity of women’s lives, but 
only the different ways in which women experience violence. This 
representation of women lacks complexity and is far from liberating. It 
constructs a fictitious homogenous subject who is weak, disempowered, 
vulnerable and in need of protection. Cultural, racial, class and religious 
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differences are all subsumed into the category of gender through women’s 
common experience of sexual violence.95 Increasingly, feminists have 
recognised the need to shift away from an exclusive focus on the victim 
subject, analysing not just subjugation but also moments of resistance.  
The disruption of the victim subject is occurring in many fields of 
feminism, and has been utilised to rethink and reformulate agency. The 
categories of victim and mad assume and assert a lack of agency. An 
alternative position available for women who kill is ‘bad’. Allowing the 
possibility of female evil is essential to the recognition of women as full 
subjects, capable of vices and wickedness because we are capable of virtues 
and goodness.96 This is significant not in terms of celebrating wicked 
women,97 but in allowing women a full spectrum of possible behaviours – 
that is, recognising and according women full agency, a capacity to choose 
wickedness as well as goodness. However, we also need to be wary of the 
type of conception of wickedness relied upon to organise female offenders. 
I argue that an attribution of wickedness does not necessarily preclude 
agency; rather, the admission of agency depends on which model of 
wickedness is applied. 
As discussed above, the models of instrumental and pure evil ascribe 
rational choice to do wrong, either to achieve specific ends or simply to 
inflict suffering. These models organise perpetrators as agents capable of 
exercising reason and choice – albeit bad reasoning and/or choices. In 
contrast, the model of monstrous evil ascribes limited agency. The 
monstrous conception precludes rational explanation for behaviour. 
Monsters is evil because they are monstrous, and they are monsters because 
they are evil. In horror films, this drive of malevolence is depicted as beyond 
the control of the monster – vampires drink blood, zombies eat brains – 
because they must. Although they are capable of action, they lack reason and 
choice.98 The role of monstrous evil prescribes limited agency to characters. 
They are inscribed as irrational malevolent creatures who want our suffering, 
requiring extreme responses in order to reinstate the boundaries they have 
challenged. Knight was represented as born bad, lacking any reason for her 
past or present behaviour, apart from her ‘nature’.  
Thus, in terms of choices of models of wickedness, the monstrous 
conception appears most consistent with ascribing women limited agency. 
Courts appear unable to understand women who kill as acting freely and 
rationally. Either women are victims or mad, or the legal categories are 
exhausted and they are monstrous. All these models stress the limited agency 
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of women who kill. However, the organisation of women who kill as 
monstrous generates problems. I will explore the way in which gender 
configurations apply in the monster/victim dichotomy. The binary relations 
inscribed in law are not stable, coherent or consistent. I argue that the law 
retains its preference for ascribing limited agency to women who kill, which 
leads to a desire to organise victimhood as feminine and monstrosity as 
masculine. This generates a problem for the law illustrated in Knight: can 
women be monstrous, or is monstrosity masculine? I draw upon two 
different approaches to the question of the gendered configuration of 
monsters that have been expounded in cultural studies. One approach 
associates agency with men, and thus regards female monsters as acting like 
men. A second approach argues for a monstrous feminine, constructed in 
relation to fears about mothering and reproduction, represented in the vagina 
dentate. I will consider each approach in turn. 
Knight Acting Like a Man 
In Men, Women and Chainsaws, Carol Clover analyses the map of gender 
configurations of characters in traditional horror films.99 Clover explores the 
character of the ‘final girl’ and how this impacts on the primary viewing 
audience – young males. The final girl manages to survive attacks of the 
monster even as her friends die around her, and at the end of the film 
manages – often with extreme violence and methods – to defeat the 
monster.100  
Given that the last character standing is a woman (although there may 
still be a suggestion that the monster is still alive for a sequel), Clover 
examines how the primary audience of young men copes. Clover accepts 
that audience members are capable of identifying with characters of different 
genders – in other words, she recognises the potential for some gender 
fluidity. However, the core of her analysis reflects and reinforces gender 
essentialism. She argues that traditional horror stories characters perform 
functions that are either female or male:  
The functions of monster and hero are far more frequently represented 
by males and the function of victim far more garishly by females. The 
fact that female monsters and female heroes, when they do appear, are 
masculine in dress and behaviour (and often even name), and that male 
victims are shown in feminine postures at the moment of their 
extremity, would seem to suggest that gender inheres in the function 
itself – that there is something about the victim function that wants 
manifestation in a female, and something about the monster and hero 
functions that wants expression in a male. Sex, in this universe, 
proceeds from gender, not the other way around. A figure does not cry 
and cower because she is a woman; she is a woman because she cries 
                                                           
99  Clover (1992). 
100  The rules of horror are expounded and parodied in the Scream series. 
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and cowers. And a figure is not a psychokiller because he is a man; he 
is a man because he is a psychokiller.101 
Clover argues that horror films illustrate a strict binary of victim/agent, 
and accordingly excludes the feminine from the active subject position. Even 
when monsters or heroes are women in horror films, they are acting like 
men. Clover supports her claims by asserting that the final girl is ‘boyish’ 
and not fully feminine in the way of her friends.102 Her gender is 
compromised by her apartness from other girls, her masculine interests and 
her inevitable sexual reluctance.103 When she kills the monster, she addresses 
the monster on his own terms: ‘She has not just manned herself; she 
specifically unmans an oppressor whose masculinity was in question to 
begin with.’104 She literally or symbolically castrates the killer by slashing or 
stabbing him open.  
Clover thus argues that it is a cinematic habit in horror films for the role 
of monster or hero to be gendered masculine. The role of victim or ‘abject 
terror’ is gendered feminine. Woman exists in the horror film (and criminal 
law) primarily as victim. When women die in horror films, the camera 
focuses lovingly on their abject terror. ‘Perfect as a tearful victim, what she 
does best is to faint in the arms of a gorilla, or a mummy, or a werewolf, or a 
Frankenstein creature.’105 Clover argues that when men are victims in horror 
films, their deaths are usually quick, but in dying they are configured as 
feminine. Horror film reflects and reinforces the Freudian essentialist view 
that woman, by nature, is a victim. This is consistent with Freud’s depiction 
of woman as terrifying because she is castrated – that is, already constituted 
as a victim.106  
Clover’s ideas represent a simplification of Butler’s idea of performing 
gender.107 According to this idea, to act – whether as monster or hero – is to 
perform masculinity. Victimhood is the province of feminine performance. 
Clover reduces agency, whether in positive or negative ways, to masculinity. 
This essentialist gendered analysis is clearly stated by Clover: ‘the helpless 
child is gendered feminine; the autonomous adult or subject is gendered 
masculine; the passage from childhood to adulthood entails a shift from 
feminine to masculine’.108 Not only does Clover emphasise victimhood as 
feminine, with its associations with passivity and being acted upon rather 
                                                           
101  Clover (1992), p 13. 
102  Clover (1992), p 40. 
103  Clover (1992), p 48. 
104  Clover (1992), p 49. 
105  Lenne (1979), p 35. 
106  Creed (1993), p 7. 
107  ‘Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a set of repeated acts within a highly rigid 
regulatory framework that congeal over time to produce the appearance of substance, of a 
natural sort of being.’ Butler (2004), p 91. 
108  Clover (1992), p 50. 
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than acting, but Clover’s association of masculinity with monstrous action 
excludes women from the capacity to be wicked. Excluding women from the 
possibility of wickedness contributes to a denial of their agency or 
autonomy. If women have no capacity to be wicked, this means that they 
have no choice about their behaviour and are not free to choose whether to 
be good or bad. 
Aspects of the judgment illustrate Clover’s arguments. Knight’s actions 
could be interpreted as masculine. Her actions were inspired by a fictional 
male counterpart in Resurrection, and in that film the unchallenged 
assumption by the police from the moment of the discovery of the first 
corpse is that the perpetrator is male. Throughout the judgment, Knight is 
referred to as the ‘prisoner’ (or on appeal as the ‘appellant’). This erases her 
identity and her gender. The only time that her name is used in the judgment 
is during a quotation from the police interviews. This can be compared with 
the judgment at first instance consistent reference to the victim as Mr Price. 
Not only is this an effort to reinstate his identity, but also his gender. He has 
been penetrated by Knight many times with her butcher’s knife. His body 
has been opened like a woman’s. In addition, the judgment notes that the last 
moment of his life must have been of ‘abject terror’ – a position Clover 
considers to be ‘gendered female’.  
There are aspects of the judgment consistent with Clover’s analysis, 
with a preference for stark gender essentialism reducing femininity to abject 
terror, with women inherently victims. In contrast, men are accorded adult 
subjecthood – with autonomy, choice and action. Through her actions, 
Knight is doubly deviant – not only does she offend against the state, but 
also against femininity. Following Clover’s analysis, she is monstrous 
because she acts like a man.  
Knight as the Monstrous Feminine 
Barbara Creed’s analysis in The Monstrous Feminine provides an alternative 
perspective on the place of female monsters (in law). Creed adopts a 
psychoanalytic approach informed by Kristeva’s exploration of abjection, 
arguing that female monsters horrify their audience in ways that are different 
from male monsters. She asserts that female monsters are defined in terms of 
their sexuality – as with all stereotypes of the feminine. In particular, Creed 
argues that the monstrous feminine is constructed in relation to her 
mothering and reproductive functions.109 The monstrous feminine speaks to 
us about male fears – specifically castration. Creed argues that Freud 
repressed the castrating women, preferring instead to focus on the horror of 
women as already castrated. In contrast, Creed asserts that the castrating 
vagina dentata is terrifying not because she is castrated, but because she 
castrates. She can tear apart and reincorporate all life. This all-devouring, 
cannibalistic aspect is completely abject.110  
                                                           
109  See also Ussher (2006). 
110  Creed (1993). 
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There are elements of the vagina dentata in Knight’s case. Although not 
much emphasis is placed upon it in the judgment, Knight is represented as 
having a voracious sexual appetite.111 Kellett stated that ‘on their wedding 
night in which she choked him by grabbing his throat because of what she 
perceived to be the comparative inadequacy of his sexual performance’.112 
She had also threatened Price and other lovers with castration: ‘If you leave 
me I will cut your balls out.’113 Knight appears to have had sex with Price 
just prior to killing him: ‘[S]he had a joyous day apparently filled with 
loving grandchildren and children, followed by enjoyable sex, with no hint 
of any aggression.’114 Post-coital death is a common feature of horror films. 
Knight appears to embody a classic position of female monster, having sex 
and then devouring her lover – a black widow spider. 
In addition to fitting the mould of the cannibalistic, castrating woman, 
Knight parodied the feminine with an excessive performance of the 
nurturing maternal. Her use of a knife to kill – which could have Freudian 
interpretations of penetration – is consistent with the tendency of women to 
kill (usually violent) intimates with household implements, particularly 
knives.115 Knight used a knife, but exceeded common practice. Instead of just 
using a kitchen implement, the facts are clear that she used a knife from her 
trade and specifically as part of the scene. 
Knight was defiantly feminine in her organisation of the crime scene 
and the rite of defilement – extravagantly parodying the role of mother and 
nurturer. In particular, when cooking Mr Price’s body parts she took the time 
to prepare and peel vegetables. She exceeded her role as nurturer by leaving 
plates for her stepchildren with buttock steaks and cooked vegetables by the 
stove. This was performative as she knew that the children would not be 
returning to the home in the near future. She also left some buttock steaks 
out for a non-existent dog. This was an excessive performance or parody of 
the nurturing maternal – a defiantly female monster. Moreover, Knight 
refused to speak at trial, with silence a traditional and mythic feminine 
role.116  
Accordingly, despite attempts in the judgment to neutralise Knight’s 
gender, her exaggerated performance of femininity at the crime scene 
resulted in her characterisation as a female monster. It was this aberrant 
feminine behaviour that was depicted as depraved, monstrous and abject – as 
                                                           
111  Similar arguments have been made about Hindley: ‘Although the prosecution placed 
considerable emphasis on Hindley’s alleged sexual aggressiveness and on the crimes 
themselves as a violation of norms of femininity and maternity, the judge’s summation 
avoided these discourses and focused instead on the strong incriminating evidence.’ 
Murphy and Whitty (2006), p 12. 
112  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 30. 
113  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 50, 53. 
114  R v Katherine Mary Knight [2001] NSWSC 1011 (8 November 2001) at 99, 
115  Mouzos (2000). In contrast, men are also likely to use hands and/or feet as lethal weapons. 
116  See, for example, Creed’s analysis of the sphinx as an object of narrative of the male hero. 
Creed (1993), p 26. 
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beyond the borders of humanity. She performed an excess of femininity. The 
monstrous feminine exceeds the law; it is created when legal categories are 
exhausted due to a failure to comprehend women who kill. The monstrous 
feminine suspends gendered assumptions of the victim/perpetrator 
dichotomy and disrupts the categories themselves. It demonstrates the 
advantage of complex notions of violence and culpability that are 
unrestricted by a requirement to ascribe either victim or perpetrator status. 
The possibility of monsters that have themselves been victimised is a 
possibility within the genre of horror.117 Monsters such as Frankenstein, 
vampires and zombies are perpetrators of violence who have themselves 
been the victim of abuse, violence and contamination. Ultimately, though, 
horror fiction illustrates that these monsters disrupt and offend boundaries of 
law and society, and are abject beings who require (beseech) resolution. 
Knight’s extravagant acts of vengeance – particularly her earlier killing of a 
puppy – are reminiscent of Glenn Close’s fictional character in Fatal 
Attraction, with a complicated story of female violence. The serial killer 
Aileen Wuornos, labelled a monster,118 also presents a complex story of 
female violence. Her claims of self-defence were unsuccessful, and she 
refused to accede to a narrative of a ‘traumatic past’.119 The failure of the 
legal categories creates a monstrous feminine with the potential to subvert 
all order. The law is unable to distinguish between her creative and 
destructive powers.  
Conclusion 
Monsters challenge and transgress cherished classifications, undermining 
ordered relations and identity. They excite such horror and fascination 
because of their potential to contaminate and pollute, to disrupt boundaries – 
whether bodily or symbolic. Monsters demand a response, whether 
expulsion or exclusion, to reassert boundaries, rules and law. They emerge 
when categories and system of order are exhausted. This happens 
particularly early for women who kill – as only the limited categories of 
victim, mad or bad are available. I have demonstrated that we need to 
critically evaluate the type of model of wickedness that is relied upon to 
construct culpability. Knight’s construction as monstrous appears to be 
consistent with the legal system’s tendency to organise female offenders as 
lacking agency – she acted due to her ‘nature’ rather than through choice. 
However, monsters are in an active position, disrupting the association of 
women with victimhood and passivity, reaffirming and reflecting the 
monstrosity of Knight.  
                                                           
117  Zizek described Romero’s Night of the Living Dead as a film ‘where the “undead” are not 
portrayed as embodiments of pure evil, of a simple drive to kill or revenge, but as 
sufferers, pursuing their victims with an awkward persistence, coloured by a kind of 
infinite sadness … a melancholic sufferer longing for salvation.’ Zizek (1992). 
118  Monster (2003). A more complex story was presented in the documentary Aileen: Life and 
Death of a Serial Killer (2003). 
119  Hart (1994), p 152. 
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This raises questions about the place of the monstrous (feminine) in 
criminal law. Should we create a category of the monstrous victim, allowing 
multiple subjectivities, with Knight occupying the position of both victim 
and perpetrator? Or should the model of monstrous wickedness be removed 
from the repertoire of the criminal law? Monsters demand extreme 
responses, and contaminate the criminal law. Reliance upon the monstrous 
conception of evil suggests that we have drawn the borders of humanity in 
the wrong places. The model of monstrous wickedness assists in evading the 
legal (and moral) duty to judge humans as humans. Monstrous wickedness is 
overly simplistic and does not adequately grapple with responsibility and 
agency. It allows us to turn away from the violent experiences which shaped 
Knight. We use the monstrous conception of evil to hide not from the 
monster but from ourselves. If we rethink the human and allow the freedom 
to choose any possibility, then we admit agency (for women) to choose evil. 
If we cannot choose between good and evil then we are moral automatons. 
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